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CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION 
“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal. Most of the global average warming 
over the past 50 years is very likely due to anthropogenic GHG increases. Unmitigated climate 
change would, in the long term, be likely to exceed the capacity of natural, managed and human 
system to adapt” (IPCC, 2007). 
With these words, the International Panel on Climate Change concluded in its Fourth 
Assessment Report that ignoring global climate change was no longer an option. Amidst a sea of 
mounting evidence – rising global air and ocean temperature anomalies, thermal expansion of the 
world’s oceans, melting Arctic sea ice, and a correspondent increase in atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) – the panel confirmed that human activity is 
significantly altering the Earth’s climate. Moreover, multiple studies have demonstrated that 
continued global climate change would be an environmental and economic catastrophe of 
unprecedented scope, threatening “the basic elements of life” (Stern, 2006). 
In the past few years, much focus has shifted away from whether the mitigation of 
climate change is a good idea, to how it might best be accomplished. Despite some public 
opposition and the lack of a single sweeping climate policy, the United States has begun to 
pursue a number of options to reduce GHG emissions and mitigate global climate change. Five 
of the largest pathways to GHG reduction are improved efficiency in buildings and appliances; 
reducing transportation emissions through improved fuel standards and alternative fuel sources; 
adjusting operations in the industrial sector to reduce emissions; improving the world’s stock of 
carbon sinks such as forests; and shifting the production of electric power to renewable sources 
of energy (McKinsey, 2007). 
 2 
However, in the absence of comprehensive federal action, the momentum for dramatic 
cuts to GHG emissions has largely fallen to the states. California, in particular, has 
enthusiastically embraced the challenge of comprehensive reform. The state adopted AB 32, the 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, which requires the state to reduce its GHG emissions to 
1990 levels by the year 2020, an ambitious challenge illustrated below (Figure I-A). This bill 
authorizes a cap and trade program, a market mechanism designed to find the most cost effective 
way to reduce GHG emissions across the entire California economy. However, the state also has 
a number of performance standards, including a renewable portfolio standard (RPS), which 
requires that by 2020, a minimum of 33% of electricity consumed in the state be provided from 
renewable sources of energy (CARB, 2008). 
 
Figure I-A Planned GHG reductions under AB 32 (CARB, 2008) 
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The recommended cap-and-trade program provides covered sources with the flexibility to 
pursue low cost reductions.  It is important to recognize, however, that other recommended 
measures also provide compliance flexibility.  As is often the case with ARB regulations, 
many of the measures establish performance standards and allow regulated entities to 
determine how best to achieve the required emission level.  This approach rewards 
innovation and allows facilities to take advantage of the best way to meet the overarching 
environmental objective.   
 
Table 3 lists the proposed measures that include compliance flexibility or market 
mechanisms.   This flexibility ranges from the potential for tradable renewable energy credits 
in the Renewables Portfolio Standard to the incentives to encourage emission reductions in 
electricity and natural gas efficiency programs to the averaging, banking and trading 
mechanisms in the Pavley and Low Carbon Fuel Standard programs to a multi-sector cap-
and-trade program.   
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Within renewable energy, a number of technologies exist that can potentially offset the 
combustion of fossil fuels and the associated emissions of CO2. Electricity can be produced by 
harnessing power from the earth’s internal heat, solar irradiance, solar heat, wind, rivers and 
tides. Wind power has gained particular interest, due to a combination of technological maturity, 
high expansion potential, and low costs. The levelized cost of energy from a wind farm is quite 
low, and even starting to approach cost-competitiveness with some forms of conventional 
generation, as shown below (EIA, 2010). 
 
Figure I-B Levelized cost of energy comparison by technology, $/MWh (EIA, 2010) 
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by using renewable energy, and ends with an estimate of cost per ton of CO2 avoided by using 
wind power.  
However, the costs of building and operating a renewable power generator do not paint a 
complete picture. Due to their unpredictable and variable generation profiles, renewable sources 
of energy such as wind impose a unique burden on the rest of the electric power system. In order 
to accommodate this less reliable renewable power, the remaining conventional generation units 
must deviate from their optimal operating profiles, increasing their costs and potentially 
releasing additional GHG. Although this burden is conceptually understood, it is not explicitly 
valued in the market today. Thus, when analysts and policymakers discuss the cost-effectiveness 
of renewable energy as a GHG-reduction strategy, a key element is missing from the cost side of 
the equation, known as wind integration costs 
The goal of this paper is to understand the role of wind integration costs in the broader 
context of California’s GHG reduction goals. Specifically, I seek to answer how integration costs 
can be understood, minimized, and allocated, so that GHG reductions can be as cost-effective as 
possible. Proper treatment of integration costs should have two effects: first, to decrease the 
social cost of wind power as a GHG reduction strategy, and second, to help drive the market to 
cost-effective mix of GHG reduction strategies. 
Notably, many other benefits of renewable energy have been ignored. There may be other 
reasons to pursue renewable energy, even if it is not cost-effective from a GHG standpoint alone. 
These other benefits are frequently said to include reduced local air pollution from nitrous oxides, 
particulate matter and sulfur dioxide; improved national security by decreasing America’s 
reliance on foreign sources of fuel; the alleviation of resource depletion concerns; domestic job 
creation through green technology infrastructure investments; and promoting price stability by 
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hedging against swings in the price of fossil fuels, especially natural gas. While acknowledging 
that these other effects are potentially valuable social goals, they are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
Why does this question require an academic focus? Simply put, policymakers must 
understand the costs of GHG reduction because the market does not. A central goal of 
environmental economics is to achieve socially optimal levels of pollution reduction at the 
lowest possible cost. According to the equimarginal cost principle, when there are multiple 
pathways to accomplish a goal – in the case, several ways to reduce GHG – society should 
pursue all the options in such a way to equalize the marginal cost of all pathways. The proof of 
this is well understood in microeconomics. 
In well-functioning markets, the equimarginal principle should be satisfied without 
government intervention. The ability to trade theoretically ensures that all opportunities for cost 
savings are found, leading to Pareto efficient outcomes. However, when economic externalities 
exist, private actions fail to lead to the lowest possible social cost, and society is leaving money 
on the table. Wind integration costs are a classic example of a negative externality. 
Pro-wind advocates might argue that this negative externality is outweighed by the 
positive externality of avoided GHG emissions, and in many cases, this could be true. However, 
California’s recent policies have begun to explicitly value the renewable attributes of wind 
power. The combination of the 33% RPS, which requires utilities to use renewable sources of 
energy to provide power, and the AB 32 cap and trade program, a market mechanism which puts 
a price on carbon, have internalized the positive externalities of wind. The negative externalities 
of wind, on the other hand, have been largely ignored by policy, and could distort the power of 
markets to find least-cost ways to reduce greenhouse gases. 
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Chapter 2 will review in more detail the physical impacts of including wind in 
California’s electric generation portfolio. While the issues surrounding wind are nontrivial, they 
are manageable, and should be the subject of serious analysis, not hyperbole and conjuncture. I 
start by reviewing the basics of system operations today, which importantly, already manage 
significant amounts of variability and uncertainty. I then show what happens when wind 
increases the variability and uncertainty. 
Chapter 3 shifts the focus from operations to economics, by looking at the general scope 
of integration costs. A substantial – but largely opaque – literature from the United States and 
Europe offers a decent consensus on the order of magnitude of integration costs, as well as some 
of the key variables and sensitivities that drive costs. Some of the key variables I discuss relate to 
physical characteristics of the electric grid and wind resources. These parameters are important 
to understanding wind integration costs, though they offer little help in the policy realm. 
Chapter 4 discusses how wind integration costs can be minimized and allocated through 
the details of electricity market structure. After a dry but necessary review of California’s 
electricity markets, I discuss six aspects of market design that represent feasible policy levers. By 
engaging some or all of these levers, California could optimize its market design to better 
accommodate wind, and internalize the externality of wind integration costs. 
Chapter 5 offers three concluding thoughts. First, the inclusion of wind integration costs 
is a necessary part of policy discussions surrounding GHG emissions. Second, technical and 
mundane-sounding market design and policy issues can have a major impact on integration costs. 
Third, the importance of integration costs will only rise, so it makes sense to act now rather than 
deal with them later. Renewable energy has an important role to play in 21st century society, but 
to properly achieve its benefits, we must also recognize – and manage – its costs.
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CHAPTER II:  PHYSICAL MANAGEMENT OF WIND POWER 
The cost of integrating renewable power can be generally defined as the cost of all 
actions taken to maintain the reliability of the electric grid in response to the uncertainty and 
variability of renewable power. This chapter will explain, from a physical operations perspective, 
exactly what those actions are. In order to do so, however, it is necessary to begin with the basics 
of electric power operations. 
2.1 Traditional System Operations 
 The day-to-day job of electric system operators is organized around one central goal: 
maintaining the reliable flow of electricity to customers, or more colloquially, “keeping the lights 
on”. In order to do this, groups known as balancing authorities maintain careful control over the 
electric grid at all times. Each such organization is responsible for maintaining reliability within 
a certain geographic region; for example, the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) 
is responsible for maintaining the reliable supply of power to most of California. 
 In order to maintain reliability, each balancing authority much match the supply and 
demand for power within its territory at all times. The demand for power is known as “load”, and 
represents the sum of electricity being drawn by residential, commercial and industrial customers. 
This power is supplied by electric generation from power plants, such as coal-fired steam power 
plants, nuclear generation stations, hydroelectric dams or wind turbines. Power can also be 
imported or exported from one balancing authority to another. 
 One crucial feature of electric power is that, generally speaking, it cannot be stored. Most 
consumer goods are produced, put into inventory, and then sold whenever a customer wants to 
buy them. Electricity has no such “shelf life”. When electricity is generated at a power plant, it 
must be consumed instantly. Therefore, balancing authorities must make sure that the amount of 
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power being generated is equal to load, not just in the aggregate, but at any given instant. If 
generation exceeds load, it will increase the frequency of the alternating current power that flows 
through transmission lines, and vice versa. By convention, electric devices in the United States 
are designed to operate using an alternating current at a constant, 60-hertz frequency. Even small 
deviations to this frequency can cause serious damage to electrical equipment, and can trigger 
generator trips or load shedding to avoid a system emergency. 
 Even without intermittent renewable technologies, the task of instantaneously balancing 
load and generation is a significant challenge for system operators. As a general rule, system 
operators cannot control the amount of load that customers demand at any given time. Therefore, 
they must forecast the expected load, and then plan ahead so that enough generation will be 
available to meet demand.  
 For example, on any given morning, the CAISO will estimate the hourly load profile for 
the next day. The ISO might estimate a load of 16,000 MW for the hour of 12am to 1am, a load 
of 15,000 MW for the hour of 1am to 2am, and so forth. Then, power plants can submit bids to 
provide this energy. The ISO will accept as many bids as necessary to meet projected demand, 
starting with the lowest-cost bids and moving up the cost curve. Based on the results of this 
bidding process, the ISO will produce an energy schedule, which specifies which power plants 
will generate power, when they will generate power, how much power they will produce, and 
how much they will be paid. It also issues daily unit commitment instructions, so that power 
plants with long start-up times can turn on or off (CAISO, 2010a). 
 However, this process is imperfect. The actual load drawn by consumers does not follow 
the neat forecast assumed during the planning process. For example, the forecast of 16,000 MW 
for 12am to 1am is almost certainly wrong. Specifically, three types of errors are possible. First, 
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the estimate of load could be biased. For example, during the first hour of the day, customers 
could use more total energy than expected. Second, the load could rise or fall during the hour, 
giving it an intra-hour load shape. For example, customers might use 17,0 00 MW at 12am, and 
decrease their usage to 15,000 MW by 1am. Third, the load could fluctuate randomly about the 
average of 16,000 MW, creating a sawtooth pattern. All three of these possibilities are both 
realistic and common in normal grid operations, and are illustrated below. 
 
Figure II-A Different types of load error 
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 In addition to load uncertainty, there is also a possibility that expected generation will be 
unavailable. For example, a fire might damage a transmission line scheduled to provide power 
from a distant source, or a mechanical failure could force a natural gas plant to shut down. While 
it is impossible to prepare for every possible contingency, grid operators include the possibility 
of these unexpected events in their planning process. 
 In short, “irrespective of current and future levels of wind generation, power systems are 
already required to cope with significant variability and intermittency concerns” (Fox et. al, 
2007). The issues of uncertainty and variability, so often associated with renewable power, 
already exist in electric systems. Operators manage these issues using “ancillary services”, which 
are used to match generation and load at a more granular level. 
 A power plant is said to provide ancillary services if a certain portion of its capacity is set 
aside to be flexible. In addition to simply providing energy, power plants can choose sell the 
ability to accommodate changes in demand on short notice. For example, a 100-MW gas-fired 
power plant might provide 80 MW of steady power, and also offer the ability to increase or 
decrease its generation by up to 20 MW. The capacity set aside for the purpose is known as the 
operating reserve. 
 Power plants can offer several different types of operating reserves, differentiated 
primarily based on how fast they can respond to a dispatch order requiring them to increase or 
decrease generation. Unfortunately, there is no single set of ancillary service definitions; the 
names and exact technical specifications vary among different balancing authorities and 
countries, largely as a matter of convention. However, there are a few common categories. 
 Almost all balancing authorities will have some kind of fast-responding ancillary service, 
variously known as frequency regulation or primary control. Regulation service is designed to 
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respond on the order of seconds, and is controlled by an Automated Generation Control (AGC) 
system. This allows generation to automatically adjust to small fluctuations in load (Rebours et. 
al, 2007). 
 Balancing authorities also have ancillary services that allow manual adjustments to 
generation, which are generally slower in response time and larger in magnitude. Generally 
speaking, there will be different types of operating reserves for load following, imbalance energy 
and contingencies. Load following refers to the ability to track the shape of the day’s load profile 
at a greater granularity than hourly schedules, and generally operates on the order of minutes. 
Imbalance reserves help to compensate for net schedule bias, and contingency reserves are in 
place to replace generation that could be lost in a system emergency, such as the loss of a major 
transmission line (Dragoon, 2010). 
 It would be economically infeasible – to say nothing of physically impractical – to have 
enough operating reserves to respond to every imaginable contingency. Instead, balancing 
authorities select a reasonable operating margin to provide a satisfactory level of reliability. The 
size of this operating margin is based on several factors, including the largest possible single 
contingency event, the availability of power plants connected to the system, and the expected 
error in demand forecasts (Ferris and Infield, 2008). Greater operating reserve requirements to 
maintain grid reliability impose a cost that is ultimately paid by electric ratepayers. 
 These ancillary services are the means through which system operators manage 
uncertainty and variability. Currently, that operating challenge is driven by the characteristics of 
load. The addition of variable energy sources, such as wind power, will increase the magnitude 
of this operating challenge; however, the challenge remains conceptually the same. 
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2.2 Understanding Wind Power’s Impact 
 Therefore, our first task in evaluating the cost of wind integration is to assess the extent 
to which wind power increases the requirement for balancing reserves. To do so, it is helpful to 
think of wind as “negative load”. Since wind power can generally not be controlled, its behavior 
is more similar to load than generation. By subtracting the amount of wind generation from load, 
one creates a new “net load” profile. Then, balancing authorities must operate traditional power 
plants so that their generation matches net load, as opposed to raw load.  
 Due to the inclusion of wind power, net load will be more unpredictable and more 
variable than raw load. However, the techniques used to balance net load are the same ancillary 
services that are provided in traditional systems. Kirby and Milligan (2008) note that wind has 
many similar characteristics to load, and that the differences in managing the two are “more of 
degree than kind,” as wind “add[s] to aggregate variability.” The crucial question is how much of 
each type of ancillary service is required, and then how much will it cost. 
 In order to determine the impact of wind power on the reserve requirements for net load, 
it is important to first understand the characteristics of wind power generation. The power 
generated by a turbine is a function of wind speed, and has 4 distinct regions. Light winds will 
not generate any power at all; the minimum level of wind required to generate electricity is 
known as the cut-in speed, often around 4 m/s. From there, the wind power increases as a cubic 
function of wind speed, until the turbine reaches its maximum rated power output. Within this 
region, the output can change dramatically in response to even small changes in the wind. Once 
the rated power is reached, usually at 13-14 m/s, the wind speed can continue to increase but 
output will remain constant. However, if the wind reaches too high of a speed, often at 25 m/s, 
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the turbines must shut down, or “cut off”, to avoid damaging the equipment. The sudden drop-off 
of power is another potential source of power variability (Laughton, 2007). 
 
Figure II-B Wind power output as a function of wind speed 
 It would be easier to manage wind output if its fluctuations could be predicted. 
Unfortunately, despite a significant amount of investment, wind forecasting remains an inexact 
science. Meteorological models are available that forecast power output based on projected 
weather patterns and geography. For time horizons of just a few hours, though, the best predictor 
of future output is simply the current value of wind output. This approach, known as persistence 
forecasting, yields estimates that are unbiased over large samples, but are not especially precise. 
In other words, forecasts are accurate when averaged over many observations, but are not greatly 
reliable for any single data point. In fact, one study in Montana found that persistence forecasts 
with a look-ahead time of 60 minutes, while unbiased, had an average root mean square error of 
20% (Dragoon, 2010). Forecast error can be somewhat reduced by aggregating forecasts over a 
larger area – for example, forecasts errors for all of Germany were 25% lower than forecast 
errors for one of Germany’s four balancing areas – but the problem remains substantial (Rohrig, 
2005). Fox et. al (2007) find that the benefits of forecasting over a large area are greatest at short 
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time frames, and fade with greater look-ahead times. A comparison of forecast errors between a 
single wind farm and 15 wind farms shows that with lead times of just a few hours, the 
aggregated forecast reduces error by 50%; however, day-ahead aggregated forecasts are only 
approximately 20% better than the single farm day-ahead forecast. 
 Even more than uncertainty, the variability of wind power is arguably its best-known 
characteristic. However, this variability follows certain recognizable patterns that are often 
glossed over. Specifically, the variability of wind power comes from several sources, including 
short, medium, and long term wind flutuations. At the most granular level, significant wind 
power variance can occur from second-to-second wind turbulence and gusts. This is especially 
true if a wind turbine is operating below its rated output, when its power will change with the 
cube of wind speed. If this variation is not smoothed out in some way, it can have a significant 
impact on power systems. However, variations on the order of 10 minutes are less significant. If 
the second-by-second variations are removed, the wind output during a given ten-minute period 
is likely to remain unchanged in the next 10-minute period, and the problem of intermittency 
seems much more manageable.  
 In the medium term, power output can follow daily patterns. For example, in California, 
wind power tends to be strongest at night and weakest during the middle of the day. Power 
output can also vary along so-called synoptic trends, following the passing of weather systems 
and storm fronts. Together, these medium term variations can cause significant variation in wind 
output. Finally, most geographic locations have some longer-term seasonal trend, such as 
particularly strong wind during the spring months in the Pacific Northwest (Ferris and Infield, 
2008). 
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 Similar to forecast uncertainty, variability can also be reduced if a system contains wind 
power from several sources. Ideally, a power system would receive wind power from several 
projects with uncorrelated output, so that random deviations would cancel each other out by the 
law of large numbers. The extent of these benefits depends on two factors: time-scale and 
geographic diversity. One heavily-cited study used German wind data from 230 sites over one 
year to quantify the correlation between different projects, and found that if output was measured 
at a short time scale, wind turbines tended to be uncorrelated (Ernst, 1999). 5-minute averages 
showed a correlation coefficient of almost zero if sited a few kilometers apart. In fact, for 
turbines just 170 meters apart, there was no observed significant correlation for second-by-
second data; the correlation coefficient only exceeded 0.2 at a time scale of over a minute. In 
other words, even minimal geographic diversity can significantly decrease the second-by-second 
variability of aggregate wind output, and modest geographic diversity can decrease the minute-
by-minute variability (Figure II-C). 
 
Figure II-C Correlations of wind farms related to distance, time intervals (Ernst, 1999) 
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 However, those same benefits are less applicable to longer-term trends. Using 1-hour 
averages, wind project output maintains significant correlation up to 80 km apart, and 12-hour 
averages are significantly correlated for projects up to 500 km apart. This is an intuitively 
attractive result, as variations over longer time scales are caused by larger weather systems, 
which are more likely to affect all of the wind farms over a significant area, as opposed to more 
random short-term gusts.  
A similar study in Western Denmark also found significant benefits of aggregation. This 
study examined the hourly change in wind generation as a percentage of installed capacity. For a 
single wind farm, changes of at least 10% of rated capacity occurred during 7% of all hours; for 
the aggregated wind fleet, however, changes of that magnitude only occurred during 1% of all 
hours. The operational implication is that geographic spacing can be a useful tool in reducing the 
need for impact of variability at shorter time scales; however, longer-term variability such as 
daily patterns will not be as easily solved.  
2.3 Incremental Reserve Requirements 
 These trends of variability and uncertainty help determine the incremental reserve 
requirements; in other words, how much more balancing capacity is required to maintain 
reliability on a grid with wind than one without wind? One common misconception is to assume 
that all variability and uncertainty associated with wind power must be counter-balanced by a 
dedicated flexible power plant. This is simply not true. Kirby and Milligan (2008) describe how 
“the power system does not need respond to the variability of each individual turbine”; instead, 
the system must “meet the North American Reliability Corporation (NERC) reliability standards 
and balance aggregate load-net wind with a aggregate generation. Fortunately, wind and load 
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tend to be uncorrelated, so they do not add linearly, greatly reducing the net flexibility required 
from conventional generation.” 
 Reliability standards are typically proportional to the standard deviation of the 
differences between actual load and scheduled load, or the load errors. For example, NERC 
standards require balancing authorities to maintain sufficient reserves such that 10-minute errors 
can be contained within certain limits 90% of the time in each month (Dragoon, 2010). In other 
words, the required balancing reserves depend on magnitude of the 90th percentile error, which is 
directly proportional to the standard deviation for approximately normal distributions. As more 
wind is added to the grid, the standard deviation of net load errors will increase, requiring more 
incremental reserves. 
 However, as Kirby and Milligan explain above, the standard deviation of net load error is 
not simply the sum of the standard deviations of load error and wind error. Instead, the following 
relationship holds true: 𝜎Net Load ≅ 𝜎!Load + 𝜎!Wind 
This relationship holds in equality if the distributions of wind error and load error are statistically 
independent. This assumption is generally reasonable, and actual data show only small 
deviations from the predictions of this equation (Dragoon, 2010; Kirby and Milligan, 2008). 
 As a result of this relationship, the incremental reserve requirements for net load are 
significantly less than reserve requirements would be to balance wind alone. In addition, the 
incremental reserve requirements are a non-linear function of wind variability. This relationship 
is graphed below, and shows an increasing marginal impact of wind power on system operations. 
The straight blue line represents the hypothetical incremental balancing requirements under 
perfect correlation, while the red curve assumes statistical independence. (Negative correlations, 
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while uncommon today, might be achieved with dynamic demand response, to be discussed 
later). 
 
Figure II-D Incremental reserve requirements of net load as wind is added 
 For example, Dragoon uses data from the Bonneville Power Administration in the Pacific 
Northwest to illustrate how net load error is significantly lower than the sum of wind and load 
errors. Using one month of data, Dragoon calculates the standard deviations of wind and load 
errors individually, the predicted standard deviation of net load error using the equation above, 
and the actual net load error. As can be seen below, the equation creates very accurate 
predictions. Furthermore, this relationship can be applied to several different measures of 
variability; Dragoon separately calculates the impact of sawtooth errors, minute-by-minute load 
following, and schedule bias. Of course, these results are specific to the data analyzed, but the 
principles of incremental load requirement remain the same. Specifically, the last column finds 
0% 
50% 
100% 
150% 
200% 
250% 
0%  50%  100%  150%  200% 
In
cr
em
en
ta
l N
et
 L
oa
d 
St
D
ev
 /
 L
oa
d 
St
D
ev
  
Wind StDev / Load StDev 
Incremental Reserve Requirements for Net Load versus 
Requirements for Wind only, shown as a percentage of 
existing reserve requirements  
45‐Degree 
 19 
that although wind errors had a standard deviation of 145.5 MW, the standard deviation of net 
load only increased by 64.5 MW when wind was added to the grid. In other words, the 
incremental net load reserve requirements were less than half of the requirements to balance 
wind power alone (Dragoon, 2010). 
Standard Deviation of Errors in… Forecast Bias Following Regulation Total 
Load  117.6 60.3 19.7 133.6 
Wind 140.0 43.1 10.3 145.5 
Net Load (Actual) 183.2 72.2 22.1 198.1 
Net Load (Estimated) 182.8 74.2 22.3 184.6 
     
Increase in Standard Deviation… 65.6 11.9 2.4 64.5 
…as percent of wind stdev alone 55.8% 19.7% 12.2% 44.3% 
 
One other key observation from this analysis is that forecast bias is the largest component 
of incremental balancing reserve requirements. This result is replicated throughout the literature. 
For example, Ferris and Infield (2008) calculate the incremental reserve requirements due to 
wind power with and without forecast errors. With a wind penetration level of 20% scheduled 
using persistence forecasts, the grid would require 7% of wind capacity to be set aside as 
operating reserves. If forecasts were perfect, however, that number would drop to 2%. 
Several other estimates exist of the impact of wind on reserve requirements. Millborrow 
(2007) estimates that if wind supplies 10% of electricity, the incremental reserve requirements 
would equal 3-6% of the wind’s rated capacity; that number grows to 4-8% at 20% penetration 
levels. Milligan (2003) estimates that with 17% of energy coming from wind, incremental 
reserve requirements equal 6-11% of rated wind capacity, depending largely on forecast quality. 
Gross et al. (2006) find similar results in a review of several studies, with 5-10% reserve 
requirements at 20% wind. Most studies find that reliability can be achieved by procuring 
balancing reserves of approximately three times the standard deviation of net load error 
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(Holttinen et. al, 2008), and are all consistent with the statistical approach described in Dragoon 
(2010). 
 It is clear that the physical challenge of managing wind is not as extreme as some 
misconceptions make it out to be, but that it also cannot be assumed away. Additional balancing 
reserves are required as the variability and unpredictability of net load grows. I now shift gears to 
discuss the cost of this managing this physical impact, and what can be done about it. 
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CHAPTER III:  EXOGENOUS WIND INTEGRATION COSTS 
 In this chapter, I explore the general scope of wind integration costs. By comparing a 
number of studies, it is possible to understand the order of magnitude for integration costs. I 
found that it is impractical, and even disingenuous, to try and specify the wind integration costs 
to an exact dollar-and-cent value. The number of varying assumptions, both hidden and explicit, 
within the literature is astounding, and without access to proprietary simulation software, it is 
impossible to isolate the effects of any given assumption. However, it is clear that several 
exogenous factors affect the wind integration cost, within a consensus range. 
3.1 Scope of Wind Integration Costs 
 Within the United States, there have been a number of production simulation studies that 
attempt to quantify the cost of maintaining reliability with various wind levels. These studies use 
proprietary models to simulate the results of electricity market activity. First, they start with 
historical load patterns, possibly scaled up to account for growth in electric consumption. Then, 
the models mimic the natural market bid process by finding the most cost-effective way to 
dispatch available generation to meet load, given a set of generating units, transmission lines, 
market rules, expected forecast accuracy, and reliability constraints. 
 To estimate the cost of wind integration, the studies will simulate the same period with 
and without wind. Wind is typically modeled as a “must-take” resource, meaning the other 
resources must work around it. Studies will include observed or simulated wind power output 
levels, as well as synthetic forecasts. These synthetic forecasts are used when the models 
simulate the unit scheduling process. Then, the models must redispatch units to make up the 
difference between expected and actual wind in simulated real-time. 
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 By comparing model runs with and without wind, it is possible to back out the costs of 
managing the uncertainty and variability of wind generation. The overall system costs generally 
decrease due to fuel savings from avoided thermal generation, but these savings are partially 
offset by integration costs. The studies provide integration cost estimates, which typically reflect 
the sum of costs from additional regulation reserves, additional load following reserves, and cost 
of scheduling units to meet the altered load shape. Furthermore, these numbers can be 
determined with different assumptions about the accuracy of the synthetic forecasts used, 
geographic diversity of the wind fleet, or other key parameters. 
 The actual models used to simulate the results of market transactions are, unfortunately, 
generally presented as “black boxes”; that is, the inner workings of the model are not revealed. It 
is therefore impossible to verify if wind power is being properly incorporated into the models. 
Furthermore, details about how future wind profiles are generated and how reliability standards 
are maintained are typically not disclosed. 
 Fortunately, however, there is a broad consensus among multiple studies about the order 
of magnitude for wind integration costs. Over 10 different system operators have conducted 
production simulation studies, often with several wind penetration level cases. The results are 
displayed below in Figure III-A (Dragoon 2010; Electrotek Concepts 2003; Enernex 2004, 2006, 
2007 and 2008; Idaho Power 2007; Northern Arizona University 2007). Generally speaking, they 
suggest that for moderate levels of wind power – between 10% and 20% penetration levels – 
integration costs fall on the order of $4 to $8 per MWh. In other words, for each MWh of wind 
energy on the grid, the resultant actions required to maintain reliability cost an additional $4 to 
$8. 
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Figure III-A Wind integration cost estimates from several studies 
 Gross et al. (2006) conduct a similar meta-analysis of European and British studies. 
Despite an exhaustive review of studies divergent in methodologies and assumptions, the authors 
find that “over 80% of studies concluded that the cost of providing additional reserves would be 
less (and in many cases substantially less) than £5 per MWh of intermittent generation 
penetration levels up to, and in some cases exceeding, 20%.” 
 The question of exactly how much CO2 is saved by using 1 MWh of wind power is the 
subject of some debate; there is no definitive answer to the counterfactual question of how much 
CO2 would have been emitted in the absence of that wind power. In California, a reasonable 
proxy value is the emissions from an equivalent amount of natural gas-fired generation, which is 
approximately .65 tons per MWh (EIA, 2010). On that assumption, every $1 in integration cost 
per MWh corresponds to an extra cost of $1.50 per ton of CO2 reduction. Therefore, the range of 
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3.2 Common Trends in Integration Cost Results 
Several additional results are common across the studies, and are consistent with the 
physical principles of wind management discussed in chapter 2. First, most studies found that 
forecast uncertainty was by far the largest contributor to wind integration costs. When models 
were run with perfect foresight – i.e. using the actual wind values as the forecasts – costs fell 
dramatically (Northern Arizona University, 2007; GE Energy, 2010). Even the inclusion of more 
realistic state-of-the art forecasts in the scheduling process was a significant improvement over 
managing all wind power in real-time without the benefit of planning with forecasts.  
 Second, the studies confirmed that costs of additional ultra-fast regulation reserves were 
minimal. This is consistent with the idea that, aggregated across an entire system, very large 
swings in power output simply do not happen within seconds, or even a few minutes. The bulk of 
costs came from unit commitment and load following reserves. 
 Third, many studies find that costs of integration increase non-linearly as a function of 
wind penetration level. There are several intuitive reasons for this result. First, as demonstrated 
in the previous chapter, there are increasing marginal quantities of balancing reserves required to 
deal with increasing levels of wind. At low levels of wind, the variability of net load only 
increases by a small fraction of the variability in wind alone. At higher levels of wind, the 
variability of net load increases at an almost 1:1 rate with the variability of wind alone. Second, 
the marginal costs of providing these balancing reserves also increase as more wind is added to 
the grid. In well-functioning markets, economic dispatch systems are used to find the most cost-
effective way to balance wind power. This means that highly flexible units that can easily 
provide ancillary services are used first, and more expensive balancing services come later. Third, 
earlier projects are likely to use the geographic areas with the highest wind speeds and capacity 
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factors, which tend to have a more stable energy output. The addition of inferior project sites can 
cause integration costs to rise.  
 Many studies find a key point of inflection in wind integration costs to be on the order of 
20% penetration. One academic study found that “fuel savings increase linearly up to a 
penetration level of 20%, after which, the rate of increase decreases continuously because of the 
decrease in the fuel costs of marginal units, the execution of the wind curtailment option and the 
increase spinning reserve requirements associated with wind uncertainty” (Albadi and El-
Saadany, 2011). Denny and O’Malley (2007) model the Irish system and find that fuel savings 
significantly decrease after a “critical point” of wind generation at 21% of electric generation, 
after which more expensive baseload units begin to bear responsibility for managing wind output. 
Millborrow (2007) reviews several more theoretical studies on high wind penetrations, and finds 
that double-digit integration costs are likely to begin when wind reaches 20-30% of electric 
generation on a standard system. 
 In most cases, the black box software used to run production simulation studies provides 
integration cost estimates to exact dollars-and-cents values. However, achieving a high degree of 
certainty around such precise estimates is difficult, if not impossible, without knowing exactly 
how the simulations work and how accurate the hidden assumptions are. The range of cost 
estimates and consensus over certain trends provides a good understanding of the order of 
magnitude of cost estimates; for our purposes, it is not necessary to reach any potentially false 
precision beyond that level. Instead, it is more prudent to examine the drivers of these costs.  
In their comprehensive review of integration cost studies, Gross et al. (2006) find that 
“the difference between individual studies is typically larger than the increase in costs within 
each study resulting from increased penetration levels. This suggests that the reserve cost is 
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particularly sensitive to assumptions about system characteristics”. In other words, while the 
order of magnitude of integration costs has been well established, the specifics depend on the 
host system. Chapter 4 will address the impact of market structure on integration costs; for now, 
I will briefly discuss some of the physical characteristics that affect integration costs in 
California. 
3.3 Exogenous Cost Drivers 
 One of the most commonly cited factors that determines integration costs is the 
penetration level of wind, and its relationship to other renewables. Fortunately, in this area, 
California has an advantage. Although California has an aggressive RPS, its current and 
projected mix of renewable projects is relatively well balanced. Forecasts for the year 2020 
shown below suggest that wind will only comprise approximately 30% of California’s RPS 
goals; solar power will comprise another 35%, geothermal another 20%, and the remaining 15% 
will come from biomass, biogas and small hydro (CPUC). The existence of legacy contracts in 
geothermal power from the days of the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act and excellent solar 
resources have helped achieve this balance. Generally speaking, geothermal provides baseload 
power, and solar’s fluctuations are independent of wind. Therefore, it seems that for the time 
being, wind’s penetration within the entire electric grid will remain below 15%, sparing 
California from the significantly higher integration costs that seem to begin at around 20%. 
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Figure III-B Projections of RPS energy by technology type (CPUC) 
 Geographic diversity in California is decent, but not great. California’s on-shore wind 
resources are clustered in three main areas: Altamont Pass which is east of San Francisco, 
Tehachapi Pass which is south of Bakersfield, and San Gorgonio Pass outside of Palm Springs; 
together, these three areas produce over 95% of California’s wind power from over 13,000 
turbines (California Energy Commission). Within each area, geographic diversity is limited, as 
the best resources are tightly clustered. However, the fact that all three areas work under the 
same ISO is good for costs, because they are far enough apart to achieve low cross-correlations.  
Another relevant factor to integration costs is overall grid flexibility, which is influenced 
by the type and cost of other generating units available to provide balancing services. In 2010, 
just over 70% of energy was generated inside of California, as opposed to imports; for reasons 
discussed in Chapter 4, in-state generation is generally used for renewables integration. Of in-
state generation, over half comes from natural gas, which is a decently flexible resource. 
 28 
Combined-cycle gas turbines that are already on, as well as gas turbines, provide an important 
source of flexibility for the grid. Approximately 20% of energy comes from “baseload” sources, 
such as coal, geothermal and nuclear power, which have difficulty with fast cycling. 
Hydroelectric power, which is physically the most flexible resource when not subject to policy 
constraints, provides 15% of in-state generation, and the remainder comes from variable 
renewable sources (CEC 2010). The figure below shows one example of how these resource 
were combined in a sample spring day from May, 2011: 
The physical flexibility of California’s resources is quite good, especially the mix of 
natural gas and hydroelectric power. This, along with the geographic distance between major 
wind farms and the fact that wind levels are relatively low, indicates that integration costs have 
the potential to be comparatively low in California. Whether or not these physical advantages 
will actually be helpful largely depends on policy and market structure, the details of which 
determine how efficiently CAISO can use its resources to integrate wind. 
Figure III-C Mix of different resources throughout a sample day in California (CAISO Renewables 
Watch, 2011) 
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CHAPTER IV:  CREATING A BETTER MARKET FOR WIND 
 Most existing wind integration studies have focused on precisely quantifying the costs. 
Often, they do so with production simulation models that operate under the assumption that the 
structure of electricity markets will remain the same. However, the academic literature points to 
the critical importance of electricity market design as one way that costs can be affected through 
policy levers. There are a great number of nuances in market structure that, despite sounding 
rather technical and mundane, have significant impacts on both the quantity and cost of 
balancing reserves required to integrate wind power. In this chapter, I discuss a number of these 
details, including how they affect integration costs and how California can optimize its market 
structure to minimize and allocate costs. First, though, it is prudent to begin with the dry, but 
important, details of California’s current market instruments for scheduling energy. 
4.1 California’s Market Design 
 It is worth understanding the conventions, terminology and market processes used in 
California’s electric markets to avoid potential confusion. While most modern electric system 
operators follow the same principles, specific details vary from region to region. Within 
California, CAISO is responsible for making sure that generation and load are always equal, and 
it does so in several stages. 
 The first stage is the day-ahead market (DAM), also known as the integrated forward 
market (IFM), and is the “first cut” at scheduling energy generation to match demand. The 
process to schedule energy for any given operating day begins with the submissions of energy 
bids. Generating units submit bid curves for each operating hour, containing several important 
characteristics. All generators have minimum and maximum physical operating levels; for 
example, a gas-fired plant may be able to operate between 20 MW and 100 MW. Then, bids may 
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include a portion of capacity that is “self-scheduled”, meaning that the generator is willing to 
supply that quantity regardless of price. The bid curve then includes minimum prices that the 
generator is willing to accept for various quantities of energy.  
 Continuing in the example, the gas generator may be willing to supply between 20 and 40 
MW at any price, so it would submit a self-schedule bid up to 40 MW. Then, it might offer to 
provide between 40 MW and 70 MW for a minimum price of $20 / MWh, and up to 100 MW for 
a minimum price of $30 / MWh. Generators may use up to 10 different price-quantity 
combinations in their bid curves, and may submit different bids for different operating hours. 
Note, however, that all accepted bids to supply energy are paid the cost of the marginal clearing 
bid, so generators have little incentive to game the market; it generally makes sense to bid at cost. 
Self-schedules, low-cost bids and high-cost bids are all paid the same price. 
 Finally, every bid contains operational details, including the cost and time required to 
startup the plant, information about whether the plant is already online, and how quickly the 
plant can move (“ramp”) from one power level to another. Bids may come from generators 
within the CAISO or anyone wishing to import power from a neighboring balancing authority. 
 Simultaneously, generation units may also submit bids to provide ancillary services. 
Specifically, the ISO explicitly procures four types of ancillary services: regulation up, 
regulation down, spinning reserves, and non-spinning reserves. (Load-following services are not 
an explicit ancillary service in CAISO, and will be discussed shortly). Regulation up and down 
are the capacity to adjust output in response to an automatic signal on a near-instantaneous basis, 
while spinning and non-spinning reserves are reserves that can provide power within 10 minutes 
in the event of a system contingency. Generators wishing to participate must include, for each 
hour, the quantity of each ancillary service they wish to provide, their minimum price for doing 
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so, and operational information about their ramp rates. These generators may submit mutually 
exclusive bids for energy and ancillary services. 
 Thirdly, in the DAM, load-serving entities submit bids to purchase energy. Similar to 
supply bids, demand bids can either come as self-schedules (i.e. willing to buy a certain quantity 
of energy at any price) or as price-quantity curves. These demand bids can be used to serve load 
within CAISO or to export power to a neighboring balancing authority. Finally, based on these 
load forecasts, CAISO will determine the desired quantity of ancillary services to meet its 
reliability obligations. 
 The DAM closes at 10:00 AM on the day before any given operating day. For each 
operating hour, CAISO uses a co-optimization model to take the energy supply bids, energy 
demand bids, ancillary service supply bids, ancillary service demand requirements, and any 
available information such as transmission constraints, and find the least-cost way to dispatch 
generation units to meet load and ancillary service requirements. Later in the afternoon, the 
results are published, and generation units can see their schedules for the next day. This DAM 
process is where the bulk of the work happens: the bulk of energy, non-spinning reserves and 
spinning reserves are scheduled through the DAM, and all regulation reserves are procured in 
this time. However, wind power almost never uses the DAM. 
 After the DAM comes the hour-ahead scheduling process (HASP). The HASP market is 
almost an exact replica of the DAM conducted for each individual operating hour. Leading up to 
each hour, the HASP is used to adjust bids to reflect more current information, with the 
exception that bids for regulation reserves may not be changed. Generators may revise their bids, 
though this rarely happens unless there is some unexpected change, such an unplanned 
maintenance emergency. Base-load generators, if not awarded a bid during the DAM, may 
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choose not to participate in HASP, due to the impracticality of starting up on such short notice. 
However, most supply bids will stay the same as they were in the DAM. More commonly, load-
serving utilities will adjust their demand bids to reflect the latest information on expected load. 
Import and export schedules may also be adjusted. 
 The HASP market is where the bulk of wind scheduling comes into play. Currently, 
California uses a program known as PIRP, the Participating Intermittent Resource Program. 
Under PIRP, CAISO contracts with an external vendor to create generation forecasts for all wind 
farms under the program. These forecasts are released 105 minutes prior to the start of each 
operating hour, and participating generators use that forecast as a self-scheduled supply bid 
quantity during the HASP. Using the officially sanctioned forecast has economic benefits for 
wind forecasters that will be discussed later. 
 New bids and adjustments for the HASP market must be submitted by no later than 75 
minutes prior to the start of any given operating hour. CAISO re-runs its optimization software, 
and publishes the results no later than 45 minutes before the start of the operating hour. By this 
point, the “baseline” hourly energy schedule is fixed, the energy schedules on the interties 
between CAISO and other balancing authorities are fixed, and the quantities of available 
ancillary services are fixed. 
 The third and final stage involves real-time operations. This stage uses two tools, real-
time economic dispatch and regulation reserve, to match generation to the intra-hour variations 
in load. Real-time economic dispatch (RTED) is how the CAISO provides load-following (LF) 
services. Suppose that the final hourly energy schedule was 5,000 MW, but load quickly 
increased to 5,100 MW. In this situation, CAISO would look back at the economic energy supply 
bids it had received, and award an additional 100 MW to the cheapest available generation, 
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subject to operational and locational constraints. Alternatively, if fell to be 4,900 MW, the 
CAISO would reduce the most expensive 100 MW of generation that could feasibly make that 
adjustment. In real-time, CAISO makes these adjustments to its economic dispatch every 5 
minutes to provide load-following. The other tool, regulation reserve, is automatically dispatched 
on a 4-second basis to counter fluctuations within each 5-minute period. At the end of every 5-
minute period, CAISO uses its real-time economic dispatch to compensate for the net change 
that has occurred since the last adjustment. This way, regulation reserves can be “reset” to their 
base point, so that this ultra-fast capacity will be fully available in the next 5-minute period.  
 The figure below illustrates this process. The lowest purple line represents the hourly 
energy schedule from the DAM, while the green line shows its adjustment from the HASP. The 
red line adds in the effects of RTED, which accounts for the difference between the hourly 
schedule and the 5-minute schedules. Finally, the blue line adds in regulation reserves, which 
account for the difference between 5-minute schedules and actual instantaneous output. Together, 
these various tools create a generation profile that can match load at a high enough level of 
granularity to ensure reliability and power quality. 
 
Figure IV-A Contribution of each market function to meeting actual load 
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 For operational reasons, real-time economic dispatch is not nearly as flexible or 
economically efficient as dispatch from the DAM or HASP processes. Adjustments at this stage 
may only come from generators that are already online. These units can vary their generation 
between their maximum rated output, and the greater of their minimum rated output or their self-
schedule quantity. In addition, real-time economic dispatch cannot use resources outside of the 
CAISO because intertie schedules are fixed during the HASP market, and even within CAISO, 
transmission constraints may lead to uneconomical results. 
 Returning to our previous example, the gas plant may have been awarded a bid to provide 
70 MW of power at a price somewhere between $20 and $30 / MWh. The plant could provide 30 
MW of load following up capacity, reaching its maximum rated output of 100 MW, subject to its 
ramp rate limit. Alternatively, it could provide 30 MW of load following down capacity, going to 
40 MW, which is the quantity that was self-scheduled. Note that RTED will not reduce the unit 
down to 20 MW, even though it is physically possible. It is important to recognize the role of 
ramp rate limits and of self-scheduling; both of these factors constrain the pool of flexible 
capacity available for load following.  
 Now that we have established the details of CAISO’s markets, we can examine the 
potential of several reforms to manage integration costs within this framework. The integration 
costs come in several forms: from energy imbalance met by load following, from increased 
requirements for regulation reserve, and from less efficient use of conventional plants. A number 
of policy levers exist that can help manage these costs. I discuss each policy lever in detail 
throughout this chapter; the following table provides a brief summary for the reader’s reference. 
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Policy Lever: 
 
Reduce Costs? Allocate Costs? 
(1) Shorten market 
intervals and gate 
closure times. 
 
Yes – reduces reserve requirements 
with more accurate forecasts 
No 
(2) Energy imbalance 
charges 
Yes – reduces reserve requirements 
with incentives for better forecasts 
 
Yes – uses “causer-pays” 
principle to recover costs 
(3) Improved balancing 
area cooperation 
Yes – reduces reserve requirements by 
aggregating load and wind, and reduces 
balancing cost by pooling flexible 
resources 
 
No 
(4) Increased 
participation in 
redispatch markets 
 
Yes – increases availability of flexible 
resources within CAISO 
 
No 
(5) Energy storage and 
demand side 
management 
Yes – reduces reserve requirements by 
inducing negative correlation between 
load and wind 
 
No 
(6) Renewable 
integration charges 
No Yes – imposes per-MW 
charge on generators 
 
 
4.2. Market Intervals and Gate Closure Times 
 It has been consistently shown that forecast error is a key driver of integration costs. In 
CAISO, inaccurate HASP forecasts cause the use of load following reserves to solve the energy 
imbalance, which costs significantly more than using the HASP bidding process to find the most 
economical way to serve load. One California study found that over 80% of incremental load 
following requirements due to wind generation are from forecast errors, as opposed to the 
inherent variability of wind (CAISO 2010). Therefore, it is prudent to examine ways in which 
forecast error can be reduced. 
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 One possibility is to adjust market intervals and gate closure times. As mentioned before, 
CAISO requires HASP schedules to be submitted 75 minutes in advance, and schedules wind in 
1-hour blocks. Both of these practices, while not altogether unusual, may contribute to 
unnecessarily high forecast error. 
 Doherty and O’Malley (2005) analyze the relationship between forecast error and look-
ahead time. In time frames of just a few hours, the most accurate predictor of future wind 
generation is current wind generation. Unfortunately, this means that forecast error increases 
quickly as a function of look-ahead time (Figure IV-B). Their paper shows that the standard 
deviation of forecast error roughly doubles from 6% of installed wind capacity with a 60-minute 
look-ahead time to 12% of installed wind capacity with a 120-minute look-ahead time. Although 
approximate, this analysis shows that over short time horizons, a given percent decrease in 
forecast horizon time will yield the same percent decrease in forecast error. 
 
Figure IV-B Increasing wind forecast error as a function of look-ahead time (Doherty and O’Malley, 
2005) 
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 Dragoon (2010) finds similar results in his analysis. Figure IV-C shows simulated 
incremental reserve requirements of a wind farm as a function of two variables: gate closure time 
and scheduling interval (Figure IV-C). Within each individual curve, Dragoon adjusts the length 
of the scheduling period, and finds that the benefits of shorter operating periods are real but 
modest. On the other hand, decreasing the lead time for forecasts has a major impact. Persistence 
forecasts taken 60 minutes before the operating period yield reserve requirements 30% lower 
than a base level of forecasts taken 120 minutes in advance; if 30-minute forecasts can be 
attained, the reserve requirements are cut in half from the base case (Dragoon, 2010). 
 
Figure IV-C Incremental reserve requirements versus market interval, gate closure time (Dragoon, 2010) 
 I found a similar trend using published data from the Bonneville Power Administration 
(BPA), which serves as the balancing authority for much of the Pacific Northwest. One virtue of 
the BPA over CAISO is that, possibly because it is a public agency, its system operations data is 
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much easier to use. BPA publishes actual wind generation and wind schedules at 5-minute 
intervals, so I was able to see how forecast error varied within each hour. Similarly to the 
literature, I found that forecast errors were greater in later parts of each hour (Figure IV-D) 
 
Figure IV-D Increasing wind forecast error throughout the hour in BPA 
 Each data point on the x-axis represents the forecast error at a certain point in the hour, 
and each line represents a different measure of forecast error. For example, the first data point on 
the middle green line represents the mean absolute forecast error, measured at the top of every 
hour for all 8,760 hours in the year 2010. The next point on that line represents the same measure 
of forecast error, with data drawn from snapshots taken 5 minutes into every hour. Note that the 
snapshots at the top of every hour, 5 minutes into every hour, and 55 minutes into every hour are 
not relevant, as the scheduled amount of wind power is ramping between one hour’s forecast and 
the next hour’s forecast. The relevant time period ranges from the snapshots 10 minutes into each 
hour to 50 minutes into each hour, inclusive. 
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 For each 5-minute interval, several forecast error measures are calculated. The bottom 
line represents forecast bias, or the simple average of forecast error. The next line up represents 
mean absolute forecast error. The top line is actually made of two lines that are nearly identical: 
root mean square forecast error, and standard deviation of forecast error. These two measures 
converge on each other as forecast bias approaches zero. 
 Notably, the MAE, RMSE and standard deviation of error all increase throughout the 
hour. The MAE increases from 104 MW 10 minutes into every hour, up to 133 MW 50 minutes 
into every hour. The standard deviation of errors, which provides a greater penalty for large 
errors, increases from 155 MW at the 10 minute mark to 196 MW at the 50 minute mark. The 
good news is that these errors are relatively small compared to the size of BPA’s wind fleet, 
which averaged 787 MW throughout the year, and had a capacity of nearly 3,000 MW. This 
supports the idea that forecast errors aggregated over a balancing area will be relatively modest. 
However, this also shows that real data, not just market simulations, confirm the idea that shorter 
forecasting lead times can reduce error. 
California’s 75-minute look-ahead time in HASP is higher than in many other areas. 
Dragoon (2010) cites a range of 75 minutes to 20 minutes of lead times prior to the operating 
period for schedule submissions in various balancing authorities. In Texas, an adjustment period 
allows adjustments to schedules until 60 minutes prior to the operating hour (ERCOT, 2005). 
The Southwest Power Pool does not lock schedules until 45 minutes prior to the beginning of the 
operating hour (SPP, 2011). In the Bonneville Power Administration, there is no central bid 
clearing house, but energy is typically traded and scheduled 45 minutes prior to an operating 
hour, and schedulers have until 20 minutes prior to the operating hour to submit schedules. BPA 
has also begun to experiment with intra-hour trading, which allows half-hour schedules to be 
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submitted no less than 15 minutes before a half-hour period (BPA, 2011a). These examples 
illustrate the possibility of using scheduling practices that could lead to greater forecast accuracy 
than those currently employed by CAISO. 
Furthermore, even if CAISO did not make any changes to the 75 minute gate closure time, 
there is still room for improvement in the forecasting lead time. The forecasts provided under by 
the ISO under the Participating Intermittent Resource Program (PIRP) – which are used in HASP 
market – are provided 105 minutes before the start of the operating hour (CAISO 2010). This 
means that there is a gap of at least 30 minutes between the forecast creation time and the closure 
of hour-ahead markets, a gap which unnecessarily exacerbates forecast error. 
It is worth remembering that, in this case, there is no real benefit to having the forecasts 
earlier than required. The CAISO’s optimization model does not run until the market closes at 75 
minutes before the operating hour, and does not benefit from having information before this time. 
Bidding strategies for other generators should be independent of expected wind power; recalling 
that all accepted bids are paid the marginal bid price, the optimal bid price strategy has little 
relation to other units’ strategies. Therefore, this 30-minute gap is an unnecessary cause of 
inaccuracy. 
A combination of these two reforms would be helpful for reducing forecast accuracy. 
First, it would be best for the CAISO to reduce the gate closure time, from its current point of 75 
minutes prior to the operating hour to a closer time, perhaps 50-60 minutes. Then, the gap 
between gate closure time and forecast issuance should be decreased, as larger gaps provide no 
real operational benefit. Together, these could decrease forecast error, and therefore, reduce 
expensive load following requirements in real-time. 
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4.3 Energy Imbalance Charges 
 Another aspect of CAISO’s markets that could use improvement is the financial 
treatment of forecast error and imbalance. Under PIRP, the status quo provides what is 
essentially a free pass to wind generators for the difference between scheduled energy and 
forecast energy. This has two main problems: first, that it removes any economic incentive to 
improve forecasting technology, and second that it externalizes the cost of energy imbalance. In 
many ways, PIRP is a classic microeconomic moral hazard problem. 
 The details of PIRP are relatively straightforward. The conditions for participation are 
twofold: first, generators must submit the PIRP forecast as their HASP schedule, and second, 
there is a nominal fee of $0.10 per MWh for the forecasting services. Through a competitive 
bidding process, CAISO selected the company AWS TrueWind as the external vendor to provide 
PIRP forecasts. In exchange for participation, CAISO essentially waives any imbalance penalties. 
Specifically, CAISO will calculate each generator’s net forecast error at the end of every month. 
At the end of the month, CAISO will either pay or charge generators in accordance with the net 
bias. If the plant output provided more energy to the grid than it was scheduled to, it has 
essentially provided “free energy”, and will be compensated at that month’s weighted average 
marginal energy price for the imbalance quantity. Conversely, if the plant delivered less energy 
than its schedules, it was paid for energy it did not deliver, so CAISO charges it the monthly 
price for this difference. These energy charges are mostly free of associated imbalance penalties, 
penalties that are applied to non-participating resources (CAISO, 2010c). In other words, wind 
generators enrolled in PIRP use load following reserves without paying their cost. 
 The effect of netting forecast errors over the month is significant. Recall that forecasts are 
accurate over large samples, but pose considerable operational difficulty because of the lack of 
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precision. One study found that, over a year, the sum of the absolute values of forecast errors in 
PIRP exceeded 500,000 MWh. However, the net error over that same time period was only 3,000 
MW (Blatchford et al., 2007). Even if substantial imbalance penalties were imposed on the net 
forecast error, the quantity would still be miniscule; netting the forecast errors masks a very large 
energy imbalance issue. 
 As a result, there is no economic incentive to improve performance. A recent analysis 
found that the statewide root mean square hour-ahead forecast error was approximately 10% of 
installed wind capacity (CAISO 2010c). While not outrageously high, this number is 
significantly higher than the preceding analysis from BPA, which had an average RMSE of 
approximately 5% of capacity. Furthermore, there are several ways in which forecasts might be 
improved. First, energy schedulers could contract with other forecast vendors, apart from the one 
chosen by CAISO, who might have a better understanding of the specific geography or 
technology of a given wind farm; there are at least 6 alternatives to the vendor chosen by CAISO 
(Dragoon, 2010). Second, during the half hour between the release of PIRP forecasts and the 
HASP market closure, the quality of forecasts could improve given new information. Finally, 
traders who work with the same wind farms may be able to exercise judgment superior to 
meteorological models and algorithms. Unfortunately, in the current system, schedulers who 
deviate from PIRP lose preferential settlements treatment, even if it improves their forecast 
accuracy. 
Furthermore, even if forecast accuracy could not be improved, the current practices of 
PIRP mean that energy imbalance will continue to be a negative externality imposed by wind 
generators. CAISO’s market settlements provide the same energy price to wind as any other 
generator, in spite of the operational difficulty. As long as this problem remains an external cost, 
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markets will not find the most cost-effective blend of GHG reduction strategies. Fox et. al (2007) 
argue that it is “not good practice” to socialize costs; instead, “costs should be allocated to those 
who can control them, thus encouraging them to invest in solutions to reduce them.” In addition 
to lower costs, “proper allocation of the costs of wind power will optimize the amount of wind 
generation.” 
Fortunately, alternatives exist to make wind generators pay for the extra energy 
imbalance that they cause, in keeping with a “causer-pays” principle. BPA has been something 
of a leader in this regard, and has adopted a sophisticated set of tiered imbalance payments for 
the numerous wind generators in its area. First, it does not allow monthly imbalance netting, but 
instead, settles accounts based on hourly imbalances. Within each hour, a small tolerance band is 
allowed for penalty-free reimbursement. Specifically, energy imbalances up to the greater of 2 
MW or 1.5% of the scheduled amount of energy are considered “band 1.” Within this band, 
energy produced in excess of the schedule is compensated at the full market price, and energy 
deficiencies are charged the full market rate, similar to the PIRP system. Beyond that band, 
though, BPA imposes a 10% haircut penalty; excess energy only receives a 90% payment, and a 
deficiency in energy quantities is charged at 110% of the market rate. Finally, a “persistent 
deviation penalty” applies if generators are consistently over-scheduling or under-scheduling 
energy over the course of several consecutive hours. When a persistent deviation penalty is 
assessed, any energy produced in excess of the schedule is not compensated at all, and any 
energy deficiencies are charged the greater $100 / MWh or 125% of the market rate (BPA, 
2011a). 
Although there is little empirical research on the incentive effects of these charges, 
informal conversations with officials from Southern California Edison who manage wind 
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resources in the area suggest that traders are “pulling out all the stops” to avoid these penalties 
whenever possible. Furthermore, the existence of these charges ensures that the wind generators, 
and not ratepayers, compensate the grid proportionally to the operational challenges they impose. 
To create incentives for lower energy imbalances, and to properly allocate costs, CAISO should 
consider replacing PIRP with these sorts of strategies. 
4.4. Balancing Area Cooperation 
 The importance of geographic diversity has been referenced several times, indicating its 
importance for keeping integration costs low. Unfortunately, as mentioned in Chapter 3, there is 
little that can be done to increase the geographic diversity of wind resource in California; high-
quality wind projects are essentially limited to the three small geographic areas with sufficiently 
high wind speeds to support viable projects. However, cooperation between neighboring 
balancing authorities can provide many of the same benefits of geographic diversity, without 
requiring a physical change in the location of wind projects. 
 The literature abounds with examples of how balancing area cooperation can reduce 
integration costs. By aggregating load, aggregating wind fluctuations, aggregating forecast error, 
and aggregating the pool of flexible generation resources, cooperating initiatives can reduce both 
the price and quantity of required incremental balancing reserves. 
 In the Nordic countries – Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Estonia – the 
NordPool spot market has allowed the countries to pool their resources as one. Denmark’s 
famously high levels of wind penetration are, in many ways, thanks to its ability to use NordPool 
to balance its wind power in a larger market. Holttien (2007) estimates that without NordPool, 
the reserve requirements would be twice as high as they are today, and more wind power would 
have to be curtailed for reliability purposes. 
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 The Western Wind and Solar Integration Study by GE Energy (2010) found similarly 
strong support for balancing area cooperation in its analysis. The figure below shows how the 
standard deviation of net load hourly changes increases as a function of wind penetration. With 
individual states treated separately, variability increases significantly with wind power; for 
example, adding 20% wind power increases the standard deviation of net load variations by 70% 
in Western Colorado, 40% in Wyoming, 25% in New Mexico, and to a lesser extent in Arizona, 
Eastern Colorado in Nevada. However, when all the regions are combined, the increase in 
variability is almost insignificant. Along the same lines, the study found billions of dollars in 
potential savings from pooling spinning reserves across the larger regions. 
 
Figure IV-E Wind's contribution to variability, depending on balancing area size (GE Energy, 2010) 
 These are simply two examples of many studies that support the conclusions that 
balancing area cooperation reduces integration costs. Compared to many balancing areas, 
CAISO already encompasses quite a large market; however, there are still ways that its 
cooperation with neighbors could be improved. 
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 The key barrier to increasing cooperation is that intertie schedules are currently locked 
when the HASP market closes. Therefore, imports and exports can only be used to balance 
expected shifts in wind and load. For imbalances between HASP-scheduled energy and actual 
production, CAISO can only depend on its own resources to balance these imbalances, even if 
there is available transmission to neighboring balancing areas. The one exception to this rule is a 
pilot program between CAISO and BPA, which allows 200 MW of wind generation to submit 
half-hour schedules over the California-Oregon intertie; however, this pilot only includes wind 
from BPA to adjust its schedules exports into CAISO, and does not increase California’s access 
to out-of-state balancing resources (BPA, 2011b). Expanding the scope of these sorts of 
programs to allow real-time adjustments to intertie schedules would allow naturally independent 
fluctuations to reduce the quantity of net balancing requirements between two areas, and would 
also allow the least-cost dispatch of balancing services over the pooled area to deal with the 
imbalance that does remain. 
4.5. Participation in Redispatch Markets 
 The existence of 5-minute economic dispatch periods is a helpful feature in California’s 
markets that should not be taken for granted. Adjusting the schedule on a 5-minute basis – even 
given numerous operational constraints – allows significant cost savings compared to using 
regulation reserves to match all intra-hour variability. In order to be as effective as possible, 
CAISO should work to ensure it has access to the broadest possible pool of resources to provide 
5-minute dispatch services. The section on balancing area cooperation discussed one way to do 
that, but another approach is to encourage greater participation in these markets from CAISO’s 
own resources. 
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 Recall that the capacity available for 5-minute dispatch is constrained by several factors. 
Load-following (LF) up services can be provided when dispatchable units have been awarded a 
bid less than their maximum operating capacity. LF down services come from dispatchable units 
that are generating more than their minimum power output; however, real-time dispatch will not 
decrease generation below self-scheduled quantities. Therefore, market participants can to some 
extent limit their participation in LF down. In addition, load following is limited in speed to the 
collective sum of ramp rates from participating units. A single plant providing 100 MW of LF up 
will not be able to increase its output as quickly as two plants simultaneously providing 50 MW 
each. Finally, load following capacity is limited by transmission constraints within CAISO, as 
well as rules against adjusting intertie schedules in real-time. 
 A CAISO study designed to examine the operational impacts of a 20% RPS tried to 
determine whether current scheduling practices provided sufficient load following capacity to 
manage the variability associated with this level of intermittent output. The required LF capacity 
to manage intermittency is represented by the maximum difference between a 5-minute schedule 
and its associated hourly schedule, taking into account natural variability and simulated forecast 
error. The study simulation found that the system’s LF up capacity was more than sufficient to 
meet operational requirements from renewable output. However, under very conservative 
assumptions about the grid’s flexibility, there were occasional instances of overgeneration, when 
LF down capacity would be unable to accommodate increases in wind power (CAISO 2010b). 
 These instances of overgeneration were expected to be quite rare, accounting for only 
0.2% of the wind’s energy. However, given that the study only modeled a 20% RPS, it is 
naturally concerning for 33% RPS implications. The hours with a high risk for overgeneration 
are typically characterized by fast increases in wind power, large amounts of must-run 
 48 
hydroelectric power, low load, and little-to-no thermal generation available for economic 
dispatch. These conditions are most likely to occur during early morning hours during the spring 
runoff season; indeed, BPA recently experienced similar problems with its wind and hydro plants, 
where an overgeneration condition required “environmental redispatch", a mandatory 
curtailment of wind power to avoid system emergencies. 
 A shortage of LF down capacity has operational impacts, but also indicates the broader 
need for CAISO to make real-time markets as robust as possible. The problems projected in the 
CAISO report are not caused by a physical lack of dispatchable generation, but instead, the 
failure of current market systems to properly forecast and prepare for these conditions. By 
achieving greater participation in redispatch markets, CAISO could lower the operational burden 
of renewable energy, and three strategies could help do this. 
 The first strategy is to let wind power participate in RTED. It may seem counterintuitive 
to use wind power to balance its own fluctuations; however, modern wind turbine design allows 
for substantial amounts of control. By making adjustments to various technical parameters, such 
as blade pitch and generator torque, wind operators can adjust the power produced by a wind 
turbine, subject the limits of wind speed and rated output (Lackner 2009). Currently in CAISO, 
wind turbines have no economic incentive to use these capabilities; the more energy they 
produce, the more they are paid. Furthermore, current practices are not well suited to wind’s 
more dynamic approach to balancing. 
 However, there is no technical reason why wind generators could not provide some 
degree of flexibility in the market, given the right price. In order for this to happen, it might be 
necessary for CAISO to create a new product type for balancing services. Rather than offering 
load following services, wind generators could more feasibly provide the ability to limit 
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generation to a certain quantity. Generators would demand a price at least as high as the expected 
market value of lost energy; in exchange, the CAISO would gain added flexibility to help 
manage overgeneration situations without sacrificing market principles. 
 A second strategy would be to encourage more generating units to offer economic bids 
instead of self-schedules. The 20% RPS operational analysis from CAISO (2010b) found that 
self-schedules currently play a large role in limiting the robustness of real-time markets. If all 
thermal plants could provide LF down services to their minimum safe output level, without the 
constraint of self-schedules, LF down capacity would be doubled. Not only would this decrease 
the likelihood of operational emergencies, but it would also provide more economic choices for 
CAISO to provide LF at minimal cost. It would be wise for CAISO to explore various incentives 
to encourage participation in these markets. Possibilities might include paying self-scheduled 
units a slightly lower rate than the market-clearing price, or providing a premium above market 
prices to units that provide load following. 
 Finally, rather than encouraging more units to bid in economic schedules instead of self-
schedules, the CAISO could reform the way it selects winning bids in the day-ahead market. One 
flaw in the current system is that day-ahead awards are made without regard to the expected 
behavior of wind power. As a result, hours in which greater variability is expected are treated no 
differently than hours with more stable wind speeds.  
 A more sophisticated system would allow the units selected in day-ahead markets to 
partially depend on the forecasted load following need. A few simple rules could improve this 
process. For example, LF up requirements will be greater when forecasted wind is low, while LF 
down requirements will be greater when expected wind is high. Certain seasonal and diurnal 
patterns could be incorporated as well; for example, wind makes the largest contribution to LF 
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requirements during the spring, and each season has certain hours where the greatest LF 
challenges are expected (CAISO 2010b). By incorporating this knowledge into the DA 
scheduling practices, along with wind forecasts, CAISO could ensure sufficient flexibility for 
challenging hours. For example, CAISO could identify “priority” hours where it sets a maximum 
percentage of energy awarded to self-schedules, limiting non-dispatchable resources such as 
imports or geothermal power. The more accurately CAISO could incorporate forecasts of load-
following requirements, the more it could target key hours for increased flexibility without 
negatively impacting economic dispatch the rest of the time. 
4.6. Energy Storage and Demand Side Management 
 Most strategies to manage intermittency focus on flexible generation. However, it is also 
possible to manage variable and unpredictable output using the demand side of electric markets. 
Energy storage and demand-side management (DSM) offer additional sources of variability that 
the CAISO could pursue to potentially lower integration costs. While many technological 
options exist, the basic idea is the same: to create a negative correlation between changes in wind 
output and changes in load. Thus, wind’s contribution to incremental reserve requirements could 
be minimized. 
 One commonly mentioned solution to the integration challenge is dedicated energy 
storage technologies. Proponents argue that energy storage devices, such as large battery arrays, 
can store excess energy when the wind is producing large amounts of power, and discharge that 
energy to the grid when the wind stops blowing. Popular media often portrays storage 
technologies as a “silver bullet” solution, and technology vendors are not shy about echoing that 
idea. For example, A123 Systems, a manufacturer of lithium ion batteries, published a white 
paper that showcases how the company’s technology can manage fluctuations in renewable 
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energy, help reduce CO2 emissions, and promote grid reliability (Vartanian). Somewhat 
amusingly, this paper cited similar research performed by Beacon Power, a flywheel 
manufacturer that also promoted its technology for renewable power integration and famously 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November, 2011. 
 The technical claims that energy storage can solve integration issues are generally true. 
However, they misrepresent both the purpose and economics of energy storage. First, energy 
storage technology could have a substantial impact on the grid today; there is a reason why it has 
not already been deployed. Claims that energy storage will be needed specifically to balance the 
wind suffer from the same logical fallacy as claims that that ancillary services are needed 
specifically to balance the wind. To the contrary, system operators use a number of tools to 
balance the variability and unpredictability of load today, and have done so largely without 
dedicated energy storage. Renewable generation does not present a new category of need in 
energy markets, and “if cheap and effective energy storage were to become available, it would be 
widely used in electricity generation systems…irrespective of renewable generation systems” 
(Infield and Watson, 2009). 
 This leads to the second issue: despite the appeal of energy storage, the economics simply 
do not add up for its use in renewables integration. Rittershausen and McDonagh (2010) examine 
the use of energy storage for intermittent energy smoothing and shaping, an application that 
could potentially reduce load following requirements, and find that costs exceed benefits by two 
orders of magnitude. Other potential uses of energy storage, such as providing ancillary services 
or shifting load from off-peak to on-peak are (1) also not cost effective, and (2) are not linked to 
renewables integration nearly as directly as industry insiders would argue. 
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 However, there are other ways to induce a negative correlation between changes in load 
and wind generation, apart from dedicated energy storage devices. Demand-side management 
(DSM) uses devices that are already deployed on the grid, and as a result, can achieve many of 
the same benefits of storage at considerably lower cost. 
 Electric vehicles are often cited as a way to manage intermittency without impacting 
generation units. Specifically, large-scale deployment of electric vehicles has two main benefits. 
First, assuming most people charge vehicles during off-peak hours, they provide a significant 
source of load during the hours when the risk of overgeneration is greatest. Therefore, having 
electric vehicles decreases the need to de-commit baseload plants in order to maintain reliability. 
Second, if electric vehicles can use “smart” charging habits, they could be used for load 
following. Modern smart-grid technology is beginning to enable individual devices to respond to 
signals and adjust their electric load accordingly. With a fleet of batteries plugged into the grid, 
the CAISO could substantially increase or decrease load in response to fluctuations in wind, 
without relying on generating units to provide that load-following capability. Even more 
impressive, “vehicle-to-grid” technology can allow electric vehicle batteries to reverse power 
flow and supply energy to the grid during periods of generation shortfall. 
 Of course, electric vehicles are an expensive way to provide this technology. However, if 
consumers plan to buy them anyway – and SCE estimates that 400,000 vehicles will be 
purchased in its service territory by 2020 (Minick, 2011) – then grid operators should look into 
using this opportunity. Lund and Kempton (2008) study the Danish system and find that the use 
of electric vehicles can substantially decrease the risk of excess renewable energy, increase CO2 
savings from wind, and enable higher wind penetrations with fewer operational difficulties.  
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 However, electric vehicles are only one example of a technology that can vary its load to 
provide integration services and lower the need for generation-based balancing. Everett (2009) 
discusses the potential of several everyday technologies whose electric load could be varied 
without significant impacts to performance, if they could respond to signals from the grid. In the 
UK system – which is larger than California’s grid, but on the same order of magnitude – Everett 
estimates 400 MW of available flexible load from domestic refrigeration, 300 MW from 
commercial refrigeration, 300 MW from large-scale water pumping and 4,000 MW from off-
peak domestic electric resistance heating. Dragoon (2010) adds that building HVAC and 
irrigation pump load could also be varied in response to centralized signals. Within limits, these 
loads could be adjusted to help integrate wind power and minimize incremental reserve 
requirements. 
 Most DSM requires some sort of smart grid, which can communicate dispatch orders to 
specific types of load. However, Infield and Watson (2009) discuss a proposal for “dynamic 
demand”, which can respond to grid fluctuations without any central control. In refrigeration 
applications, compressors can be programmed to respond to small fluctuations in grid frequency. 
If the grid AC frequency rises above the standard of 60 Hz, it means that generation is exceeding 
load, so compressors can be programmed to detect that change and increase the power of their 
compressor. Similarly, if the grid frequency drops, compressors can turn off without any direct 
order from the ISO. This kind of technology can facilitate the spread of DSM even without a 
smart grid. 
 The vast majority of renewables integration studies take load as a given, and discuss 
integration costs based on the assumption that the pool of generation resources is exclusively 
responsible for managing the variability in wind output. Such an approach, if practiced in reality, 
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would lead to unnecessarily high integration costs. Unfortunately, the exclusion of DSM 
practices from these studies makes it difficult to quantitatively assess the potential cost savings 
by using DSM. However, it is qualitatively clear that these measures can play an important role. 
 Fortunately, CAISO already contains an infrastructure for DSM. However, most 
programs are centered around reducing non-critical load during peak summertime hours, such as 
air condition cycling or agriculture and pumping interruptible programs. With relatively modest 
market reforms, the same kinds of programs could be used to help manage renewable output, for 
example by reducing load if wind power decreases faster than expected. Economic incentives for 
participation in these programs already exist; the focus simply needs to expand from peak load 
management to include renewables integration. 
 Unlike some other market reforms, DSM programs require the active involvement of 
utilities, as opposed to simply their consent. CAISO can directly control its interactions with 
generators and utilities; however, it does not have that same level of direct access to individual 
customers who might sign up for a flexible load program. Nonetheless, with the right economic 
incentives, DSM could be a helpful tool to minimize integration costs. 
4.7 Wind Integration Charges 
Finally, one proposal that could help internalize the costs of intermittency is a simple 
integration charge. BPA, in addition to its performance-based imbalance charges, also has a flat 
rate known as a Variable Energy Resource Balancing Supplement. This fee is currently set at 
$1.23 / kw-month of installed wind capacity, which roughly translates to $5.70 / MWh with a 
30% capacity factor (BPA, 2011a). 
Compared to imbalance charges, this approach lacks the advantage of creating incentives 
for improved performance. In addition, this kind of approach in an ISO may face legal 
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challenges, since the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission could potentially consider this a 
violation of ISO’s obligation to provide non-discriminatory open access to transmission. It is an 
open question if this would be seen as reasonable cost-recovery along the lines of 
interconnection fees, or a subsidy for specific technologies. 
On the other hand, this approach provides the benefits of administrative ease and 
financial certainty. Having a flat fee structure makes it much easier for utilities to incorporate 
integration costs into their decision making process; forecasting imbalance payments would be a 
much harder task. It also allows CAISO to be certain it will recover a certain quantity of revenue 
and properly internalize costs. Finally, a flat rate helps to avoid politically difficult questions 
about defining the scope of a single wind farm for purposes of netting energy imbalance. For 
example, some might argue that imbalance charges should be imposed on each schedule 
submitted, while other suggest that companies should be charged for the imbalance of their entire 
net wind fleet. Thus, even though imbalance payments more accurately follow the “causer pays” 
principle, a simple rule might be the easiest.
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CHAPTER V:  CONCLUSIONS 
Renewable energy is a popular and exciting topic, and it deserves no less. Unfortunately, 
because the stakes of energy policy are so high, there is hyperbole from wind power’s supporters 
and its detractors in the public sphere. Hopefully, the preceding analysis has shown how 
integration issues are manageable but nontrivial. Three concluding remarks follow. 
First, integration costs matter. In the discussion of cost-effective greenhouse gas 
reductions, it is important to be honest about the true costs of every strategy. The GHG 
abatement cost curves constructed by McKinsey (2007) show an enormous array of strategies to 
reduce greenhouse gases, many of them with similar marginal costs. With wind integration costs 
in California ranging between $4 and $8 per MWh – and consequently, $6 to $12 per ton of CO2 
avoided – the impacts of this analysis on the optimal mix of GHG reduction policies is 
potentially significant. 
The whole purpose of a cap and trade system, like the one being developed under AB 32, 
is to find the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions. Internalizing the cost of pollution is 
one key step that allows this to happen. However, accurately representing the costs of each 
potential strategy is just as important. Individual players in a cap and trade system will seek to 
maximize their private benefit, which only corresponds to maximum social benefit if all external 
costs are included. The issue of wind integration costs should not be treated as an insult to the 
industry or its technology; instead, it is simply a technical reality. 
Second, market structure and policy issues can have a major impact on integration costs. 
The realistic policy levers to manage integration costs may not be the ones with the most popular 
appeal. Giant energy storage projects are not cost-effective, and CAISO can not simply “spread 
 58 
out” wind generators. The inherent flexibility of generating resources is largely fixed, and 
policymakers have only limited control over the mix of renewable technologies. 
On the other hand, issues that sound very mundane can play a major role in driving 
integration costs to the lower end of the range. Policies should be designed to minimize and 
allocate wind integration costs. Cost minimization means that GHG emissions from wind will be 
cheaper. Cost allocation means that the market will accurately find the optimal mix of GHG 
reduction strategies, and has the side benefit of creating an incentive for even further cost 
reduction. 
Specifically, some combination of the six policy levers from Chapter 4 could go a long 
way to meeting these goals. CAISO could look into shortening market intervals and gate closure 
times; introducing imbalance charges; expanding balancing area cooperation; increasing the 
robustness of economic redispatch; using more demand-side management or storage; and 
integration fees. Each of these has either empirical or theoretical support for its role in 
minimizing and.or allocating integration costs. 
Finally, wind integration costs will only increase with time. Thanks to a diverse resource 
mix, California should see modest integration costs for the time being. However, as 
policymakers consider moving beyond the 33% RPS standard to even more ambitious goals, they 
are more likely to encounter the non-linearities found in most studies. Furthermore, if California 
truly wants to be a national leader, it needs to demonstrate that its solutions can be replicated at 
the national scale, not just in areas whose wind resources are balanced by significant solar, 
geothermal and hydroelectric potential. California will have to address the issue of integration 
costs at some point; it might as well do so now, when the costs are still modest and controversy 
might be less heated.  
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In the 20th century, when renewable energy was still something of a novelty, integration 
costs would not have seemed like a major consideration. The solar panels on the roof of Jimmy 
Carter’s White House would have had an infinitesimal impact on the electric grid, and renewable 
energy plants subsidized by the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 generated a truly 
miniscule amount of energy. However, policies as aggressive as California’s 33% RPS and  cap-
and-trade program mean that the days of viewing renewable energy as a technological curiosity 
are well on their way out. As the quantity of renewable energy increases, and as the urgency to 
achieve cost-effective GHG solutions grows, it is no longer acceptable to ignore the hard 
operational details of renewable power. Significant help from state and federal policy has 
allowed wind power to earn the premium it rightly deserves for reducing CO2 emissions; 
however, enlightened and efficient markets must consider costs as well as benefits. California 
has long been a national leader in promoting environmental awareness and stewardship, and its 
current policy regime is solidifying that reputation. Prudent action to understand, minimize and 
allocate wind integration costs can ensure that this reputation will not be for simple idealism, but 
for smart and economically efficient planning as well. 
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